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1. Introduction
The growth of interdependence has produced a corresponding increase in governance activities 
to manage that interdependence.  Observers of world politics have rightly noted (and politicians 
have criticized) the increasing density and complexity of these institutional arrangements. 
Scholars of international relations have only begun to study the complex landscape of 
governance activities.  Our paper aims to contribute to this new area of inquiry. We begin from 
two observations about the status of scholarship to date.  First, the work on institutional 
complexity, which we describe in further detail in the following section, focuses almost 
exclusively on public forms of institutionalized cooperation. With relatively few exceptions, this 
work systematically excludes a key source of variation: private authority.  Second, the work on 
private authority tends to focus on explanations of its emergence, rather than on its effects.   
There is a commonly held view that forms of private regulation and governance arise when 
intergovernmental cooperation fails.  While we do not dispute that this is sometimes the case, 
this paper focuses on the longer-term effects of private authority—namely, the ways that public 
and private authority interact over time.   In so doing, we bring an historical perspective to the 
study of institutional complexity; we cannot understand the interaction among these myriad 
institutions without an examination of the events which gave rise to both their creation and 
evolution. 
In sum, we argue that a more complete understanding of regime complexity must include private 
authority, which we define as situations in which non-state actors make rules or set standards that 
other actors in world politics adopt.  Moreover, including private authority requires re-thinking 
the shape of private regimes, as well as the interaction between public and private regimes.  This 
interaction occurs in two ways – one static and one dynamic.  We show how each of these 
interactions affects the overall “design” of the regime complex and its evolution over time.  To 
explore these two arguments, we propose an “unbundling” of the regime complex, to trace the 
specific mechanisms through which public and private authority co-exist and interact.  We argue 
that private authority is not merely a response to gaps in public authority; rather, we explore the 
possibility that private authority can address the political and institutional constraints present in 
public authority.  We argue that private authority can provide functional improvements to 
existing regime complexes by helping to overcome path dependencies that public authority may 
face.  We describe three specific mechanisms through which this might occur:  by providing a 
redefinition of the problem, supplying a “repository” where different policy approaches can exist 
until their time becomes “ripe”, or serving as an additional means through which to diffuse 
public authority.  
Our paper proceeds as follows.  In the first section, we briefly review the literature on regime 
complexes and institutional interplay to identify shortcomings in the existing understandings, 
particularly with respect to the potential role of private authority. We then review the burgeoning 
literature on private authority to further explore two mechanisms for public / private interaction 
within the regime complex: competition and reverberation. This section closes by describing the 
three cases—climate change, tropical commodities, and fisheries—and justifying how we 
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delineate the boundaries of each regime complex.  The second section develops hypotheses about 
how we expect public and private authority to interact via each of these mechanisms.  The third 
section turns back to the cases and historically traces the interaction of public and private 
authority to determine the plausibility of our expectations. The closing section draws broader 
lessons for work on regime complexes which incorporate our insights about the role of private 
authority.   
2. Literature	  Review
2.1	  REGIME	  COMPLEXITY	  
Regimes exist as a unit of investigation in world politics to capture ordered patterns of behavior 
among states.  Definitions range from ones confined to explicit state commitments or multilateral 
agreements2 to the broader-ranging definitions about norms and expectations3 Since our analysis 
is focused on institutional configurations, we follow Levy, Young and Zürn’s emphasis on two 
common regime characteristics; regimes are “social institutions in the sense of stable sets of 
rules, roles, and relationships,” and they are “issue-area specific.”4  In this way, we take an 
institutional perspective on regimes, not one that requires convergence of expectations. 
A regime complex can be understood as: “an array of partially overlapping and nonhierarchical 
institutions governing a particular issue-area.”5  They exhibit three key characteristics.  First, 
regime complexes comprise “elemental regimes” which may functionally overlap.  The 
elemental regimes in the regime complex for plant genetic resources include the Food and 
Agriculture Organization, the UN Convention on Biological Diversity, and the WTO’s 
agreement on intellectual property rights, among others.  Each of these elemental regimes is 
governed by a separate international agreement, and has its own organizational structure.    
Second, there is no agreed upon hierarchy to resolve conflicts among regimes.  Hence, actors 
may choose from a variety of tactics to avoid inconvenient rules, including forum shopping,6 
regime shifting,7 or capitalizing upon inconsistencies among rules.8  Third, because of the 
density of governance arrangements, regime complexes exhibit path dependence; present rules 
constrain and shape the creation of new ones. 
The regime complex is an analytical unit that delimits areas of institutional density.  A number of 
global problems have been studied explicitly as regime complexes, including plant genetic 
resources,9 climate change,10 energy,11 and emissions trading.12   However, there is a 
2 Haggard and Simmons 1987 
3 Krasner 1983 
4 Levy, Young, and Zürn 1994 
5 Raustiala and Victor 2004, p279. 
6 Hafner-Burton 2009 
7 Helfer 2009, Betts 2009.  
8 Raustiala and Victor 2004. 
9 Raustiala and Victor 2004. 
10 Keohane and Victor 2011.   See also Michonski and Levi 2010. 
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considerably broader body of literature that addresses a very similar issue—how governance 
arrangements interact and conflict under conditions of rising density—that is not explicitly 
described as work on regime complexes.13  For example, a number of scholars point to a shifting 
mechanism in governance—a clear result of complexity.  When there are multiple venues, sets of 
rules or governance processes, actors have the option of choosing between them.  Goldstein and 
Steinberg describe a shift in trade rulemaking from rounds of negotiation to a judicial process.14  
Helfer describes attempts by various actors to shift the governance of intellectual property both 
to and away from TRIPs.15  Mattli and Büthe describe a shift in the form of regulation—from 
domestic to international product standards.16  A number of scholars have identified situations in 
which states “forum shop”, to find institutions most hospitable to their political goals.17  This too 
is a form of shifting, where states move cooperation from one venue to another. 
 
In addition to shifting, the literature has also examined other effects of complexity.  Mattli and 
Woods offer a theory of global regulatory outcomes that rests in part on institutional supply—
that is, the landscape of regulatory institutions.  When there is an “extensive supply”—which 
refers to both the number of venues, as well as the quality of the rulemaking processes—
regulatory outcomes are more likely to be in the public interest.18  Jupille and Snidal discuss the 
conditions under which states will choose one institution over another, change an existing 
institution or create a new one in order to address a cooperation problem.19  Here, the effect of 
complexity is simply the ability to select one governance arrangement over others.  Alter and 
Meunier point to two additional effects of complexity: competition and reverberation.  In the 
former, the existence of multiple related institutions drives competition among them; in the 
latter, the acts of one institution “reverberate” on others, causing unanticipated consequences.20 
 
In some cases, institutional density gives rise to fragmentation: numerous institutions working on 
similar issues without strong mechanisms of coordination.21 Although not explicitly a part of the 
regime complex literature, there is also a body of work that examines and prescribes solutions to 
regime fragmentation. Within the realm of environmental governance, works such as Biermann’s 
argument for a World Environment Organization22 and the work of Gehring and Oberthür on 
interplay management,23 are examples of efforts to understand and improve the functioning of 
dense arrangements of international institutions.  
 
                                                                                                                                                       
11 Keohane et al 2011. 
12 Green 2008. 
13 Much of this work builds from the discussion of interplay presented by Young 2002. 
14 Goldstein and Steinberg 2009. 
15 Helfer 2004 and 2009. 
16 Mattli and Büthe 2003. 
17 Davis 2005.  
18 Mattli and Woods 2009. 
19 Jupille and Snidal 2006. 
20 Alter and Meunier 2009, p19-21. 
21 The debate about the creation and function of a World Environment Organization took up the question of whether 
fragmentation was desirable or impeded effective governance.  See Whalley and Zissimos 2001, Najam 2002, 
Newell 2002. 
22 Biermann 2002. 
23 Gehring and Oberthür 2008, 2009; Oberthür 2009; Oberthür and Gehring 2006. 
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To advance our collective understanding of the causes and effects of institutional complexity, we 
offer three critiques of existing work.  We acknowledge that the work in this area is relatively 
new and still developing.  With this caveat, we point to three shortcomings which we aim to 
address in this paper.  In our view, these weaknesses limit the ability of the concept of the regime 
complex to explain both governance arrangements and their outcomes.   
 
The first critique is related to the way that the concept has been both defined and operationalized.  
Victor and Raustiala note that regime complexes are “marked by the existence of several legal 
agreements.”24  In their description of the regime complex for climate change, Keohane and 
Victor describe various multilateral agreements and “clubs,” as well as programmatic efforts by 
international institutions.25  The special issue by Alter and Meunier similarly focuses almost 
exclusively on the institutional fora created by multilateral arrangements. (The exception is 
Kelley’s work on election monitoring, which we return to and build from below.)26 Earlier work 
by Aggarwal, which considers the nesting arrangements and parallel institutions under conditions 
of complexity, is limited to two institutional forms: bilateral or multilateral.27  In short, none of 
these works explicitly considers the role of private authority in the regime complex.  
 
In our view, to understand the effects of density, we must consider all of the institutions that 
foster increased institutional complexity.  As such, we argue that “elemental” regimes need not 
be restricted to multilateral agreements, as Raustiala and Victor suggest. Rather they may include 
forms of private regulation as well. While some scholars have noted private authority features in 
an increasing array of regime complexes,28 attention to their unique qualities vis-à-vis 
intergovernmental processes has received very limited attention. We, therefore, examine this role 
explicitly and particularly whether and under what conditions private authority might provide a 
functional improvement to a regime complex’s operation, overcoming long-understood path 
dependent processes affecting intergovernmental processes.29  
 
Our second critique focuses on Alter and Meunier’s work on the feedback effects of regime 
complexity.  Their special volume on international regime complexity provides a useful starting 
point for further investigation.  The feedback effects they identify—competition and 
reverberation—are descriptively useful, but theoretically underspecified.  They note that 
competition among institutions and actors can give rise to both positive and negative effects.  
Negative effects include turf battles, repetitive efforts or uncoordinated policy that is easily 
undone.30  Positive effects include productive experimentation, diffusion of risk and increased 
resources addressing the issue.  However, the authors do not specify the conditions under which 
                                                
24 Raustiala and Victor 2004, p279. 
25 Keohane and Victor 2011; see especially Figure 1. 
26 Kelley 2009, p 61. 
27 Aggarwal 1998. 
28 Abbott and Snidal 2009 is the notable exception; their analysis of regulatory standard-setting includes public, 
hybrid and private initiatives. Biermann et al. 2009 also identifies the role of private institutions in what they call 
“global governance architecture”, which is conceptually very similar to the idea of a regime complex.  
29 Keohane 1988. 
30 Alter and Meunier 2009, p19. 
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we should expect positive or negative competition.  Their discussion of reverberation is similarly 
underspecified.  The authors note that reverberation occurs when changes in one institution cause 
changes in another which are unintended and/or difficult to control.  This observation provides 
little guidance on when this is likely to occur, or its effects.  In our empirical discussion below, 
we offer preliminary hypotheses for these two outcomes.  As such, we aim to offer a more 
theoretically oriented treatment of the effects of regime complexity.   
 
Both of these feedback mechanisms include an implicit effect of time.  Raustiala and Victor note 
that path dependence is an important feature of regime complexes; they do not evolve and 
change from a clean institutional slate.31  This important insight is further developed in our 
discussion below, where we hypothesize how private authority can help promote cooperation by 
providing additional and uniquely tooled venues within the regime complex. Many scholars have 
discussed how private is distinct from public authority. We build on these propositions by 
examining origins of private authority in specific regime complexes to determine whether and 
under what conditions they may provide functional improvements.   
 
Our third critique deals with the difficult issue of defining boundaries.  As noted above, the 
concept of the regime complex is a way to group institutions, delimiting areas of density.  This, 
in turn, implies that boundaries are an important part of understanding the interactions among 
institutions: the interactions are necessarily constrained by the institutions included in (or 
excluded from) “the complex.”  In our view, no work on regime complexity has taken up this 
issue.  Raustiala and Victor discuss the demarcation and blurring of boundaries of elemental 
regimes within a regime complex, but not the question of what elemental regimes should be 
included or excluded.  Similarly, Keohane and Victor discuss the use of issue linkage to promote 
fragmentation or cohesion in regime complexes, but provide no guidance on how the analyst 
should draw the boundaries in the first place.32  For example, should governance activities 
focused on preserving biodiversity be part of the regime complex for climate change?  What are 
the implications for including or excluding these institutions?  
 
We feel that the issue of delimiting scope is an important one; without it, anything (and 
everything!) could be part of a regime complex.  If this is the case, generating hypotheses 
becomes more difficult.  For example, how can we predict the conditions under which 
reverberation occurs, if a change in any institution constitutes an instance of reverberation?  
Indeed, the issue of boundaries is essential to obtaining any analytical leverage from the concept 
of regime complexity.  
 
2.2	  PRIVATE	  AUTHORITY	  	  
The literature on private authority has evolved quickly.  Scholars are no longer asking whether 
private actors matter for world politics, but instead are focused on the ways that they do.  Earlier 
works identify the various forms of private authority, distinguishing between those which rely on 
state or intergovernmental processes for implicit or explicit sanction33 and others which derive 
                                                
31 Raustiala and Victor 2004, p. 296-99. 
32 Keohane and Victor 2011, p9. 
33 Cutler 1999; Börzel and Risse 2005. 
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their authority from the market supply chain.34  This body of research has examined theoretical 
issues such as the conditions leading to the emergence of private governance institutions35  and 
how and under what conditions they might gain authority and/or political legitimacy.36  It has 
also taken up empirical questions concerning different levels of involvement across firms,37 
countries,38 and economic sectors;39 and the competition among private regulatory programs.40  
Though recognizing that businesses do often develop private self-regulation to fend-off or 
preempt government regulation,41 the basis for much of this work has been an implicit or explicit 
assumption that private authority might serve to improve global governance in a particular 
domain42 and at the very least that it should be seen as one important source of global business 
regulation.43  In short, many posit that private authority can serve as a functional improvement to 
other governance arrangements.44   
 
Research attention has recently shifted to understanding how private authority interacts with 
public authority.  Much of this work examines the conditions under which different kinds of 
interactions occur, ranging from synergistic to neutral to conflicting.45  In most cases, however, 
these studies do not retrospectively examine the manner in which private venues within regime 
complexes altered the governance dynamics, potentially creating functional improvements.  
Some scholars hint at this possibility,46 but careful elaboration of the mechanisms through which 
this occurs is largely absent.  
 
2.3	  THE	  CASES	  
To address this gap, we identify mechanisms—static and dynamic—by which private authority 
may serve to improve the functionality of public authority.  We should note here that we do not 
think private authority is categorically a positive influence on global governance, but in this 
paper we focus on improvements to governance efforts rather than other potentially deleterious 
effects.  We use three regime complexes—climate change, tropical commodities and fisheries—
as cases to explore the plausibility of these mechanisms (Table 1).  We begin, in this section, by 
describing the history and evolution of the public aspects of each of these three cases.  In later 
sections, we turn to how private authority has featured in each regime complex at various points 
                                                
34 Cashore 2002. 
35 Bartley 2003; Pattberg 2007; Bartley 2007, Green 2010. 
36 Bernstein and Cashore 2007; Cashore 2002; Cashore, Auld, and Newsom 2004; Cutler 1999. 
37 Sasser et al. 2006 
38 Espach 2005, 2006; Gulbrandsen 2005b, 2005a; Cashore, Auld, and Newsom 2004; Cashore et al. 2007; Stringer 
2006 
39 For coffee see e.g., Fridell 2007, for labor see e.g., Fransen 2010. 
40 Overdevest 2005; Fransen 2010. 
41 Gunningham and Grabosky 1998 
42 Gulbrandsen 2004. 
43 Braithwaite and Drahos 2000. 
44 Hall and Biersteker 2002 provide an alternative perspective by defining private authority to include crime 
families, which they note act in opposition to public authority.  
45 Auld et al. 2009 Levin, Cashore, and Koppell 2009 
46 Auld 2010a; Pattberg 2007, Green 2011. 
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in time.  We focus here on the central public nodes of each regime complex to resolve the 
boundary issue: by delimiting our examination to the central public node in each case, we can 
restrict our analysis to the ways in which private authority interacts with each specific node, 
rather than the regime complex writ large.  We recognize that boundaries could be defined 
otherwise and likely should be for other research questions.  We are not claiming that this is the 
only or the best way to define the relationship, but contend that research on regime complexes 
must be clearer about definitions, no matter how defined, for research to advance.  Below, we 
provide an overview of the key multilateral institutions that have served as hubs for our three 
regime complexes.  
	  
Table	  1:	  Description	  of	  public	  and	  private	  dimensions	  of	  regime	  complexes	  
 
Regime Complex Characteristics of Public Authority in Regime Complexes 
  
Climate Centered on the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change, with the 
UN Environment Programme and UN Development Programme 
undertaking related programmatic activities.  The Global Environment 
Facility and World Bank serve as key financial institutions; the 
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change as main scientific body.  





Led by the UN Conference on Trade and Development, with network of 
organizations and councils for specific commodities, including the 
International Tropical Timber Organization, the International Coffee 
Organization and others.  
 
Fisheries Centered on the UN Convention on Oceans and the Law of the Sea, with 
the Food and Agricultural Organization and Regional Fisheries 
Management Organizations serving implementation functions; the UN 
Convention on Biological Diversity and the Convention on the 
International Trade of Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and Flora 




a.	  Climate	  Change	  
The climate regime complex began to coalesce in the 1970s and now centers on the UN 
Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC). The first political event on climate 
change, the World Climate Conference, was convened by the World Meteorological 
Organization (WMO) in 1979, and focused primarily on scientific research.48 Almost a decade 
later, in 1988, the WMO and UNEP formed the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change as a 
body mandated “to provide internationally coordinated scientific assessments of the magnitude, 
                                                
47 For a more expansion conceptualization of the regime complex for climate change, see Keohane and Victor 2011. 
48 Agrawala 1998. 
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timing and potential environmental and socio-economic impact of climate change and realistic 
response strategies”.49  In the interim, the Vienna Convention for the Protection of the Ozone 
Layer was adopted in 1985, and was quickly followed by the negotiation of the 1987 Montreal 
Protocol on Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer. It aimed to reduce, and eventually 
completely discontinue the production and use of chlorofluorocarbons (CFCs), which had been 
shown to serve as a catalyst for the destruction of the ozone layer.50 Both ozone agreements are 
relevant to climate change because CFCs and particularly, their substitutes, contribute to the 
greenhouse effect.  For instance, some of the chemicals adopted as CFC substitutes, including 
HCFCs and HFCs have been shown to be potent greenhouse gases, which are now regulated 
under the Kyoto Protocol and covered by amendments to the Montreal Protocol. 
 
The UNFCCC, signed at the Rio Earth Summit, provides the legal foundation for the climate 
regime that exists today.  Parties agree to track and report their greenhouse gas emissions, and in 
the case of developed (or Annex I) nations, to create domestic policies to reduce emissions.  
Although it provides little in the way of specificity, and virtually nothing with respect to 
obligations, the UNFCCC did produce a very important outcome, laying the foundation for the 
negotiation of binding targets under the auspices of what would become the Kyoto Protocol, 
adopted in 1997. The Kyoto Protocol, which entered into force in 2005, requires developed 
countries to meet specific reduction targets, which they may do through three different market 
mechanisms.  It is set to expire at the end of 2012. 
 
The attempts to move the Kyoto process ahead have spawned two new key institutions: the Ad 
Hoc Working Group on Long-Term Cooperative Action under the Convention (AWG-LCA) and 
the Ad Hoc Working Group on Further Commitments for Annex I Parties under the Kyoto 
Protocol (AWG-KP). The AWG-LCA was created in 2007 with the stated goal of launching “a 
comprehensive process to enable the full, effective and sustained implementation of the 
Convention through long-term cooperative action, now, up to and beyond 2012.”51  The main 
areas of focus for the AWG-LCA as outlined in the Bali Plan of Action are mitigation, 
adaptation, finance and technology, and capacity building.  The AWG-LCA missed its interim 
deadline, failing to present a final text for a future plan at COP-15 in Copenhagen.  The Parties 
then extended the mandate of the group an additional year.52  A year later at COP-16 in Cancun, 
Parties adopted the lengthy “Cancun Agreements,” which outlines a long-term vision for global 
efforts on mitigation and adaptation, including voluntary efforts by developing countries, 
promised funds for reducing deforestation in developing countries and a new Green Climate 
Fund to disburse funding to developing countries.53   
 
The AWK-KP was created in 2005, shortly after the Kyoto Protocol entered into force. Its goal 
was to develop an agreement on future commitments for Annex I Parties after the end of the 
second commitment period of the Kyoto Protocol, from 2008-2012.  The negotiations of the 
                                                
49 UN General Assembly 1988, Resolution 53.  
50 Rolands and Molina 1974.  
51 This decision was taken in the “Bali Action Plan” FCCC/CP/2007/6/Add.1, Decision 1/CP.13. 
52 FCCC/CP/2009/11/Add.1, Decision 1/CP.15. 
53 FCCC/CP/2010/7/Add.1, Decision 1/CP.16.  
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Working Group have yet to yield any definitive decisions.  The Parties failed to come to an 
agreement in Copenhagen about individual and aggregate reduction targets.54  A year later in 
Cancun, and despite interim meetings, little progress toward new targets had been made.  The 
AWG-KP continues its work, now racing against the clock: it hopes to agree to a new set of 
targets before the expiry of the Protocol at the end of 2012.55   
 
In sum, the central public node in the climate regime complex is the UNFCCC.  It has a number 
of associated bodies, including two that are struggling to advance the intergovernmental process.  
As has been well covered by scholars and press alike, the form of any future agreement is 
uncertain at best.   
 
b.	  Tropical	  Commodities	  
The set of institutions arising to deal with terms of trade for basic commodities solidified after 
the Second World War. The first focal institution arose from the Havana Charter. Though the 
Charter was never adopted, its chapter on commodity agreements informed a 1947 decision of 
the UN Economic and Social Council to form an Interim Coordination Committee for 
International Commodity Agreements (ICCICA), which was charged with advancing agreements 
among producers and consumer countries for the management of commodity markets.56 The 
ICCICA established four agreements (i.e., coffee, sugar, tin, and wheat). However, these 
advances fell short of expectations and led the UN General Assembly to adopt resolution 1995 
(XIX) in 1964 setting up the UN Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) and giving 
it responsibility for coordinating agreements for commodities exported by developing 
countries.57 At its first session, UNCTAD’s Secretary General, Raúl Prebisch provided an 
analysis of the problems facing developing countries that linked commodity export earnings with 
development, setting the stage for UNCTAD’s work on commodities in the subsequent years.58 
This work was further advanced at UNCTAD’s fourth session in 1976 where a resolution 
established the Integrated Programme for Commodities (IPC) that was to work on commodity 
agreements for 18 goods, including tropical timber.59 
 
Over the coming years, efforts to negotiate and maintain commodity agreements met varied 
success. Sugar and tin were adopted in 1954. A coffee agreement was adopted in 1962, and 
agreements for cocoa and natural rubber were adopted in 1980 and 1981 respectively. Tropical 
timber followed in 1983.60 But just as the International Tropical Timber Agreement emerged, the 
other agreements broke down or at the very least had their economic provisions terminated. 
Sugar lapsed in 1983, tin collapsed in 1985, and cocoa and coffee ended their market 
interventions in 1988 and 1989 respectively.61 The natural rubber agreement was terminated in 
1999.62  In the years since, UNCTAD’s commodity initiatives have involved a broader array of 
                                                
54 ENB, Summary of the Copenhagen Climate Change Conference.  Accessed at 
http://www.iisd.ca/vol12/enb12459e.html.  
55 FCCC/KP/CMP/2010/12/Add.1, Decision 1/CMP.6 
56 Mojarov and Arda 2004; UNCTAD 1985 
57 Mojarov and Arda 2004 
58 UNCTAD 1985, p57 
59 Khindaria 1982; Poore 2003; Humphreys 1996 
60 McDermott 1983; Khindaria 1982; Gilbert 1996 
61 Gilbert 1996. 
62 http://www.unctad.org/infocomm/anglais/rubber/ecopolicies.htm 
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activities meant to address problems associated with commodity production and trade, 
particularly for developing countries. With the inability to progress with commodity agreements 
addressing market regulation, its work has involved a number of connections with non-state 
actors.63  
 
In sum, the public node for tropical commodities is UNCTAD, but the overall regime complex is 
fragmented, including a number of other institutions focused on the trade and management of 
individual commodities.  
	  
c.	  Fisheries	  
The regime complex for fisheries centers on the 1982 UN Convention on the Law of the Sea 
(UNCLOS). Emerging from a protracted negotiations process reaching back to the first Law of 
the Sea Conference in 1958, UNCLOS sets a broad framework for international cooperation on 
oceans. For fisheries, it reinforced the role of the FAO and pre-existing Regional Fisheries 
Management Organizations (RFMOs) such as the Asia-Pacific Fisheries Commission and the 
General Fisheries Council for the Mediterranean formed in the 1940s.64 These remain central to 
ocean governance; 18 such bodies hold management responsibilities and 24 play advisory 
roles.65  
 
Within this broad framework and following the Rio Earth Summit, additional agreements and 
cooperative efforts have developed. Immediately after Rio, talks commenced in April 1993 and 
led to the approval of the UN Fish Stocks Agreement in August 1995,66 which addresses the 
management of straddling and highly migratory stocks (roughly 10% of the world’s capture 
fisheries). It also bolstered the role of RFMOs: states fishing stocks covered by a RFMO were to 
become members and where a RFMO did not exist, states were required to establish one.67 In 
October of 1995, the FAO Code of Conduct for Responsible Fisheries Practices was adopted by 
the 28th Session of the FAO Conference.68 Although the UN Fish Stocks Agreement only entered 
force in November 2001, many of its provisions were inserted in domestic laws earlier through 
voluntary adoption of the FAO Code.69 Finally, the FAO Compliance Agreement was negotiated 
in 1993 and entered force in 2003. It requires that: flag states ensure recorded vessels meet 
conservation obligations in international and regional fisheries agreements, even if the state is 
not a member of a specific RFMO; high-seas fishing receive authorization from the flag state; 
and high-seas fishing rights only be granted if a state has capacity to control fishing activities on 
these waters. 
 
                                                
63 Mojarov and Arda 2004. 
64 http://www.fao.org/docrep/W3123E/W3123E07.htm 
65 DeSombre 2000, p. 109-110. http://www.fao.org/fishery/rfb/search 
66 deFontaubert 1995; Doulman 1995. 
67 Cochrane and Doulman 2005. 
68 Caddy 1999. 
69 Cochrane and Doulman 2005. 
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On the periphery, but still important to marine and fisheries regulation, the 1973 Convention on 
International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and Flora (CITES) and the 1992 
Convention on Biological Diversity (CBD) offered additional provisions increasingly relevant to 
fisheries management and production. These agreements will gain importance as ocean stocks 
further dwindled.70 Already a few commercially significant species are on the CITES Appendix 
II, meaning that only trade not reducing the species survival is permitted.71 
 
The fisheries regime complex shares characteristics with both the climate change and tropical 
commodities. Similar to UNFCCC, there is a clear central public node—the regime complex 
centers on UNCLOS. Like tropical commodities, it includes a number of other institutions which 
manage regional issues (RFMOs) or represent cooperation on specific fisheries issues (the 
compliance agreement).  
 
 
3.	  Analytical	  Framework:	  Static	  and	  Dynamic	  Effects	  of	  Private	  Authority	  
	  
Now that we have briefly outlined the contours of public authority in each regime complex, we 
turn to the static and dynamic mechanisms for understanding the role of private authority.  Our 
point of departure is the simple premise that private authority may help overcome some of the 
obstacles that inhibit cooperation in the intergovernmental processes. This is not a controversial 
starting point. Indeed, much of the work discussed above embeds this premise implicitly in their 
analyses of private authority.  
 
We posit that private authority may be a “functional improvement” in the sense that it is not 
constrained by the same degree of path dependence as public authority within the regime 
complex.  Path dependence can be understood as an institutional outcome which is seen to defy 
some theoretical model. The idea of a competitive market, for instance, leads economists to 
wonder why sub-optimal technologies come to persist and even dominate markets (e.g., 
QWERTY versus DVORAK typesets).72  In other social sciences, Mahoney explains, 
functionalism, legitimacy and power may also serve as theoretical models for defining path 
dependence.73 As we describe in the following sections, the dynamic and static effects of private 
authority are different types of responses to obstacles to cooperation in public authority.  To the 
extent that it seeks to overcome the sub-optimal outcomes that result from path dependence, we 
consider private authority to be a functional improvement.  
 
The key difference that promotes cooperation in cases where public authority may be 
unsuccessful is the regulatory target. Whereas states are the key members of intergovernmental 
regimes, having responsibilities for domestic implementation and enforcement, private authority 
generally targets those actors responsible for economic activities in a given sector. While states 
can be major buyers and sellers of goods and services via state-owned operations or through 
procurement practices, this role is an economic rather than regulatory role.74  
                                                
70 Kura et al. 2004. 
71 Caddy 1999; Cochrane and Doulman 2005 Richards and Maguire 1998. 
72 David 1985. 
73 Mahoney 2000. 
74 Cashore 2002. 
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This difference alone implies a number of features consistent with the “functional improvement” 
ability of private authority.  First, there will be a greater turnover of the regulatory targets for 
private authority than for public authority. Although states come and go—the recent successful 
referendum for the succession of Southern Sudan for instance—the level of volatility among 
corporations is without doubt orders of magnitude higher.  This changing landscape of regulatory 
targets means that gridlock is less likely to occur, both because it can mean interests change 
more regularly and because collective institutions set up by private interests form and collapse 
with greater ease.  Second, we posit that private authority is inherently more flexible in terms of 
the kinds of institutional structures it can create. It may have greater flexibility in re-conceiving 
institutional responses, tailoring a programmatic response that seeks to overcome difficulties 
encountered among public institutions in the regime complex. Third, forms of private authority 
are often less highly legalized, and therefore more easily reversed.75  Because of this, there may 
be less opposition to private governance arrangements, since the targets of private regulation 
know that rules can be amended.   
 
Does the absence of strong institutional legacies, combined with the fluidity of relevant actors 
provide an opportunity for private authority to innovate?  Can private authority create functional 
improvements to public governance arrangements? There are at least two ways we foresee this 
potentially occurring, one static and one dynamic. 
 
3.1	  STATIC	  EFFECTS	  
Given private authority has greater autonomy from the strictures of intergovernmental processes, 
it is plausible to expect that when faced with a problem that has reached the international agenda, 
private authority will be able to better fit an institutional response to the problem.76  This is in 
part because private authority can respond to, and therefore benefit from, earlier 
intergovernmental efforts.  In other words, private actors learn from others’ actions, sizing up the 
political landscape as well as the political constraints.  They also act opportunistically, waiting 
for a window in which they may be able to insert themselves and successfully project authority.  
One way that private authority can accomplish this is through problem definition.  When 
intergovernmental efforts stall, private actors may redefine the problem to alter the types of 
institutional responses and the political winners and losers.77  Thus, problem definition is likely a 
product of both the nature of the problem itself and the institutional approach taken by public 
institutions to address the problem. From this we offer the following hypothesis. 
 
Hypothesis 1: Public institutions will condition private responses to collective action problems in 
ways that promote a different framing / construction of the perceived problem. 
 
                                                
75 Abbott et al. 2000. 
76 Fit can be loosely understood as the degree of congruence between the ecosystem and the institutional 
arrangement Young 2002, p. 20. 
77 On strategic approaches to problem definition in the policy process, see Rochefort and Cobb 1994 and Stone 
2002. 
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If this proves valid, we expect to see progenitors of private authority constructing governance 
arrangements in ways that explicitly seek to operate synergistically with public authority or to 
address failures or difficulties in intergovernmental or state processes. Although, as Alter and 
Meunier and others have noted, competition may serve as a mechanism that facilitates 
governance improvements in the longer term, we argue that this should be separated from a static 
analysis of whether or not private authority, at the moment of emergence (i.e. t0), is seen as a 
complementary contribution to a regime complex. Hence, for this hypothesis to prove valid, we 
expect to observe private institutions emerging to address aspects of a problem that public 
institutions at that given time struggle, or are unable, to address.   
  
3.2	  DYNAMIC	  EFFECTS	  
Over time, private authority has the potential of functionally improving cooperation within a 
regime complex via a number of different specific mechanisms. First, the procedural 
requirements of state and intergovernmental processes mean private authority may be more 
adroit, changing quickly to integrate new knowledge about problems or adapting due to 
experiences gained via learning by doing. Research on private authority highlights the capacity 
of these institutions to serve as learning mechanisms.78  
 
Second, building on Alter and Meunier, private authority can serve as an arena of 
experimentation, able to undertake projects which would not be feasible within 
intergovernmental for a.  As noted above, there is a greater potential fluidity in private 
institutions.  Hence, one can expect that private authority may provide an opportunity to 
experiment with alternative governance solutions.79  Hoffmann broadens this argument to look at 
a wide range of climate experiments being undertaken at different governance levels and both by 
public and private institutions.80 One of the underlying ideas here is that eventually the 
experiments may feedback to shape the regulatory interventions by the state, possibly improving 
this eventual cooperative response.  Thus, the dynamic effects of private authority on the regime 
complex serve to shape and change future public cooperative efforts.    
 
Third, and beyond these direct interactive effects, private authority may also provide an 
alternative solution to cooperation problems by providing a competing, alternative view of the 
problem and institutional response.  In this view, private authority exists within the regime 
complex, but has a dynamic interaction effect by serving as a repository in which a different 
conception of a problem can persist.  This institutional alternative co-exists with other public 
formulations of the problem.  This ensures that this conception is not systematically excluded 
from the agenda of a given regime complex, potentially ensuring functionally improved 
cooperative action on a problem in the longer-term.  When thinking about overcoming path 
dependence, such a latent idea can serve as the starting point for a broader regime 
transformation.81  It is this third mechanism that our analysis focuses on, as specified in the 
following hypothesis.  
                                                
78 Levin, Cashore, and Koppell 2009; Bozzi et al. Forthcoming; Auld 2010a. 
79 Newell and Paterson 2010, p.127. The experimentalist literature, as embodied by Sabel and Zeitlin 2008, also 
points to this learning approach; however, they do not apply it specifically to private actors.  
80 Hoffmann 2011. 
81 Crouch and Farrell 2004. 
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Hypothesis 2: Private institutions within a regime complex can contribute to functional 
improvements to public authority by: 
H2(a): providing a competing formulation of the problem that shapes future governance 
arrangements, or 
H2(b): providing an additional venue through which to diffuse public authority. 
 
Both of these dynamic mechanisms can be understood as forms of reverberation, as described by 
Alter and Meunier, where changes in one institution cause unanticipated changes in another.  
Here the “causal” change is the failure (or relative failure) of cooperation among public 
institutions.  The result is reverberating effects in private institutions within the regime complex. 
Kelley’s work on election monitors, including non-governmental monitors, highlights this as a 
possible benefit of complexity as “the existence of choice of regimes can open up alternatives 
that might not otherwise have been politically feasible to implement.”82 
 
Unlike the first static hypothesis, this dynamic mechanism means that public authority can 
reverberate through private authority within the regime complex through these two mechanisms, 
potentially providing functional improvements to public authority over time or at some point in 
the future.   
4.	  Analysis	  
 
In the final step of our analysis, we trace the development of private authority in the respective 
regime complexes to explore the plausibility of the static and dynamic interactions. Building 
from the descriptions of the three regime complexes provided above, we offer a brief assessment 
of the extent to which they are achieving their desired goals.  This is not meant to be a rigorous 
analysis of institutional effectiveness; our aim is to identify whether there might be opportunities 
for private authority to solve cooperation problems not adequately addressed by the public nodes 
in each regime complex.  We do not consider the other (myriad) multilateral initiatives or the 
interactions among public institutions since other parts of the complexity literature address this 
dimension of interaction.  We focus on our contribution to the literature—the interaction between 
public and private authority. 
	  
4.1	  HYPOTHESIS	  ONE:	  STATIC	  EFFECTS	  
The climate regime complex provides an instructive example of the static effects of private 
authority. Although the UNFCCC appeared it might follow the model of the Vienna 
Convention—framework convention followed by binding and stronger protocols—the 
negotiations up to and after Kyoto followed a different course. As is well-known, the Kyoto 
Protocol has a long and storied history.83  The critiques are numerous: the required reductions are 
too small to have any measurable effect on climate change, the compliance mechanism is arcane 
and counterintuitive, the Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) fundamentally unworkable, 
                                                
82 Kelley 2009, p. 61 
83 For an in depth survey of the provisions and their negotiating history, see Grubb et al 1999.  
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and so on.84  The US, the largest per-capital producer of GHGs, has not ratified.  A realistic 
evaluation of countries’ progress suggests that many will miss their targets, some by miles.85 It is 
not necessary to pronounce the Kyoto Protocol “dead” to recognize that it has failed to achieve 
even its own modest goals. Thus, we see that the first multilateral efforts at even “moderately 
deep” cooperation on climate change have missed the mark. 
 
Private authority outside of intergovernmental arrangements first emerges around 2001—the 
year that the US announced that the Kyoto Protocol was “fatally flawed” and that it would not 
pursue ratification.  At the time, the US was the world’s largest emitter of greenhouse gases; its 
failure to participate undercut the environmental effectiveness of the treaty, and threatened to 
completely unravel international cooperation.   At the same time, private actors began to create 
rules governing greenhouse gas emissions.86  Thus, the timing of the emergence of private 
authority is the first important datum to note.  Although the climate regime complex had been 
developing for some twenty years, private authority does not assume a position of prominence 
until efforts at intergovernmental cooperation hit their first sizeable obstacle.  
 
The private authority that began to emerge can be divided into four different types of rulemaking 
processes: those that deal with offsets, procedures for accounting, and rules for transparency and 
trading.87  Offset standards provide rules for measuring avoided emissions.  Accounting 
standards provide a protocol for actors to measure and report their emissions.  Transparency 
standards provide a centralized repository for users to report their emissions to others.  Trading 
platforms create a system for quantifying, buying and selling carbon emissions. 
 
These categories of private authority respond to the shortcomings of Kyoto in a variety of ways.  
First, they all target different actors than the Protocol.  Whereas the participants in Kyoto are 
necessarily states, these private standards target non-state actors of all stripes: firms, NGOs, and 
sub-national actors.  All private governance arrangements are of course, voluntary; thus those 
who adopt them choose to opt in.   Second, the accounting and transparency standards are 
focused on emissions measurement and reporting rather than reductions.  These forms of private 
authority purposefully sidestep the contentious issue of mitigating emissions, and focus on 
understanding their sources.  As one person involved with the creation of accounting standards 
noted, “you cannot manage what you don’t measure.”88  The strategy then, is to build awareness 
and capacity around emissions measurement, with the hope (but not the explicit design) that this 
will lead to future reductions.  Third, virtually all private standards emphasize the reputational 
benefits of adopting voluntary measures, framing the problem as one of image management 
rather than mitigating climate change.   Finally, a number of the private offset standards 
emphasize the environmental “co-benefits” of their rules.  Buying offsets certified under the 
Gold Standard or Climate Community and Biodiversity will not only address the problem of 
climate change, but also provide public goods such as biodiversity or social development.  These 
                                                
84 See, for example, Malakoff 1997, Victor 2001, Depledge 2006, Wara 2007.   
85 UNFCCC 2011.  Accessed at 
http://unfccc.int/files/press/backgrounders/application/pdf/fact_sheet_the_kyoto_protocol.pdf.  
86 There were earlier private efforts, such as internal trading programs created by BP and Shell, yet both were short 
lived pilot programs.  
87 Green 2011. 
88 Author interview with Janet Rangathan, World Resources Institute, 19 May 2009. 
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offset standards are addressing an additional environmental problem—the preservation of diverse 
ecosystems—thus changing the frame of the cooperation problem to be addressed.  
 
It is beyond the scope of this paper to evaluate the effectiveness of these private governance 
arrangements.  However, their relative durability and the growing number of users of the many 
standards suggest that private authority is coordinating action on climate change in ways that the 
Kyoto Protocol has not.  Moreover, in the area of offset standards, private authority is promoting 
mitigation above and beyond that which is occurring under the auspices of the market 
mechanisms of Kyoto.  Almost half of the credits purchased in 2010 on the voluntary market 
were purchased voluntarily by for-profit firms, not under obligation by any regulatory 
requirements.89   The total value of the voluntary market is approaching half a billion dollars.90  
These static effects provide preliminary evidence for our first hypothesis: private authority has 
conditioned private responses to climate change which respond to different conceptualizations of 
the problem.  
 
The other cases also provide evidence to support our first hypothesis.  In the case of the tropical 
commodity coffee, Max Havelaar—the world’s first fair-trade labeling initiative—formed before 
the suspension of the International Coffee Agreement’s (ICA) market regulations.  The ICA rules 
maintained coffee prices above a floor price, but were suspended in 1989.  That Max Havelaar 
took form before the floor price ended allowed it to concentrate on problems other than terms of 
trade, which we noted above were integral to how UNCTAD’s Secretary General, Raúl Prebisch, 
defined the commodity problem.  Indeed, one of the specific challenges Max Havelaar sought to 
address was market access.  It emerged to give UCIRI—a Mexican coffee cooperative—an 
alternative market channel that cut out intermediaries and that ensured more coffee could be 
exported under “fair trade” terms than was possible through existing alternative trade 
organizations.91  As an agreement among states, the ICA did not address distributional issues 
within countries, allowing elites in coffee-growing countries to benefit from the increased 
revenue flows.92 Thus, Max Havelaar can be seen as a functional addition to this regime. It 
served to provide some—even if small at first—offset to the distributional issue. However, after 
1989, the floor price became as important, or even more important, than the market access 
concerns.  It has remained a significant focal point for fair trade since then, a point to which we 
return in discussing the dynamic effects.  Hence, in relation to our first hypothesis, the timing of 
private authority in the regime complex is important: it meant Max Havelaar could seek to help 
coffee farmers in ways that built from the ICA’s floor price.  It added market access, pre-
financing and long-term contracts as provisions to further enhance the welfare of participating 
coffee farmers. 
 
                                                
89 Peters-Stanley et al. 2011, pp. 45-47. 
90 Ibid.  
91 Jaffee 2007, p. 13. 
92 Subsequent research has documented rent seeking behavior in both Indonesia (Bohman, Jarvis, and Barichello 
1996) and Brazil (Jarvis 2005). In both cases, considerable waste was incurred due to efforts taken to capture ICA 
quotas. See Ullman 1978. 
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Tropical timber also represents a case where private certification emerged to address a gap that 
intergovernmental processes were unable or unwilling to address.  In the late 1980s, tropical 
deforestation was recognized as a large problem, both for maintaining biodiversity and 
preventing climate change.  Producer countries within the ITTO had vested economic interests in 
maintaining their export markets, and thus were instrumental in stopping an effort to introduce a 
tropical timber labeling program through the ITTO.93  In addition, the threat of a challenge by 
these same tropical countries via the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade of the legality of 
efforts by countries to ban the importation of unsustainable tropical timber helped amplify 
interest in a private option.94  It was clear that current intergovernmental arrangements were not 
adequately addressing the problem of tropical deforestation, and not making much progress 
toward improvement.  
 
The Forest Stewardship Council (FSC) was established by some of the same groups that had 
tried to lobby for an intergovernmental response both via the ITTO and a global forest 
convention, but were rebuffed. One goal of the FSC was to promote the certification of 
responsible forest management. The standards it crafted reflect its attempt to fill gaps left by the 
intergovernmental process. For instance, forest management, rather than the processing side of 
the forest products trade, was deemed the most substantial regulatory “gap”.95  Similarly, the 
FSC standards included a ban on the use of genetically modified organisms in certified forests, a 
provision which reflected heightened concerns about this technology in agriculture and the 
wariness in North America with governments’ unwillingness to impose regulatory restrictions 
sought by environmental groups.96 
 
For other commodities, the pattern of problem re-definition is less clear. One of the major 
reasons for this is the sequence of events. Whereas labeling fair trade coffee emerged with the 
intergovernmental regulatory regime as the reference point, once the certification model 
appeared, the motivation for certification spreading to other commodities appeared to differ in 
ways that reflect isomorphic processes.  These patterns highlight how such emulation alters the 
relationship between private and public authority. We will return to some implications of this in 
discussing the dynamic effects. 
 
As noted above, private authority does not always create functional improvements within a 
regime complex.  Evidence from tea and fisheries demonstrate how private authority can 
potentially undercut domestic regulation. Besky’s analysis of tea underscores that while fair 
trade may fill a “gap” in an international regime complex, it may simultaneously circumvent 
domestic regulations, in this case, colonial-inspired institutions set up to regulate the operation of 
Darjeeling tea plantations. 97  “These regulations”, Besky explains, “unlike those of fair trade, 
account for the power of individual owners to manipulate the system to maximize profits. In 
Darjeeling, fair trade standards from the Fair Trade Labeling Organization International (FLO) 
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94 Bartley 2003. 
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have undermined what local laws and government labor officers have done to promote social 
justice in Darjeeling.”98  
 
With fisheries, we observe a similar differentiation between the domestic and international 
levels. At the international level, programs such as the Marine Stewardship Council (MSC) 
emerged to facilitate the implementation of the various international agreements. Although there 
was an impression that the fisheries regime was advancing cooperation through the early 1990s, 
discussion of the shortcomings on the implementation side did serve as a “gap” the MSC sought 
to fill.99  However, since most fisheries policy is overseen by national governments, in countries 
with extensive and stringent requirements, fears emerged much like those with tea. There were 
worries that the MSC either deflected attention away from the enforcement of these laws or 
preempted other conservation actions, such as the enactment of marine protected areas.100  As 
another example, Ponte argues MSC certification in South Africa was used to consolidate power 
among a handful of processors, to fend off efforts to reallocate quotas away from incumbent 
fishing operations, and to protect interests of trawlers over long-line segments of the hake 
fishery.101  
 
The examples from tea and fisheries demonstrate that private authority may have unintended 
consequences which hinder, rather than help, institutional efforts already in place within the 
regime complex.  Private authority may become, as others have argued, solutions looking for 
problems, which do not therefore necessarily match the static gaps in a particular public 
regime.102  In other words, in some cases private actors may successfully project authority 
because they are making substantive contributions to the issue at hand; in others, they may 
simply be finding a way to insert themselves into the governing process.  In the latter case, the 
addition of private institutional arrangements within the regime complex is likely to be driven by 
powerful actors who see opportunities to leverage complexity in their favor – such as businesses 
looking for cover from potential regulations or larger, international NGOs advancing their 
perception of a given problem over those of smaller, localized groups. We return to this issue 
further in considering the dynamic effects of private authority.  
 
4.2	  HYPOTHESIS	  TWO:	  DYNAMIC	  EFFECTS	  
The dynamic, or reverberation, effects of private authority are evident in the climate regime 
complex in two different areas: in the interaction between public and private markets for offsets 
and in the developing discourse around REDD and REDD+.  Recall that the dynamic effects of 
private authority affect public authority in two ways: by providing a competing formulation of 
the problem and by providing an additional venue through which to diffuse public authority. 
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Starting with the Bali Action Plan in 2007, Parties to the Kyoto Protocol have identified an 
additional mechanism for combating climate change: Reduced Emissions from Deforestation and 
Forest Degradation, or REDD.  Put simply, REDD provides financial incentives for developing 
countries to conserve forests.  REDD is a clear example of a reformulation of the climate change 
problem: in addition to being a problem about emissions (and emissions reductions), climate 
change is now about forest management.  As the UN-REDD website notes: “Deforestation and 
forest degradation, through agricultural expansion, conversion to pastureland, infrastructure 
development, destructive logging, fires etc., account for nearly 20% of global greenhouse gas 
emissions, more than the entire global transportation sector and second only to the energy 
sector.”103  The implication is clear: our carbon problem is partly a forest problem.  Moreover, 
the solution to this forest problem turns on private authority; much like carbon markets now, 
financial rewards for REDD will depend on third-party measurement and verification of carbon 
stocks.     
 
The relationship between public and private offset standards provides an additional example of 
the dynamic effects of private authority.  The CDM of the Kyoto Protocol allows developed 
countries to meet their emissions reductions requirements by purchasing carbon “offsets” in the 
developing world.  These offsets include a variety of activities that remove greenhouse gases 
from the atmosphere, and at the same time, are deemed to promote development in the host 
country.  The governing body of the CDM has created an equally diverse set of rules to measure 
the amount of GHG removed in each category of project.  Offsets in the voluntary market work 
in the same fashion, save for the fact that removals are not credited against some larger target 
(because there is no binding regulation).   
 
As noted above, the political slowdown surrounding Kyoto gave rise to a host of new voluntary 
private standards, including nineteen different offset standards.104  Despite this proliferation of 
private institutional arrangements, closer analysis demonstrates that these private arrangements 
are not independent of public authority; rather, public authority reverberates through them.  
Upon careful inspection of the rules set forth by each standard, we see that fully 79% of the 
private standards recognize public rules created under the CDM.  In this sense, private authority 
shapes public authority by providing another venue for its diffusion.  Although we cannot predict 
the future, it is clear that even if the Kyoto Protocol expires, the offset rules it creates will persist 
through the voluntary markets.  (And indeed, any future regulatory market will likely consider 
this in its design.)  In other words, the full effects of this dynamic interaction will not be known 
for some time.  Indeed, this is demonstrative of our larger message: many of the effects of 
private authority can only be understood when considering multiple time periods.  
 
This reverberation of public rules through private authority is also demonstrated by the coffee 
case.  The floor price for coffee was initially taken from the ICA, but has since become an 
embedded component of fair trade. And the fair trade premium has indeed become an important 
benchmark by which other programs are often measured.  FLO’s practice of requiring a 
particular price persists as a conception of the commodity problem that differs significantly from 
most other extant public and private governance initiatives.105 There has been a general move 
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away from price supports as the appropriate instrument, with greater attention to market 
intelligence, information sharing, enhancing quality, and spurring further demand as means to 
address the specific market conditions of individual commodities. Thus, even though FLO has 
been limited to capturing a small segment of the markets for which it certifies goods (usually 
under 1% of the world market),106 its attention to market prices as a component of the problem 
requiring attention reinforces how private authority can, as a dynamic effect, provide a 
competing formulation of the problem that may shape future governance.  
 
Tropical timber provides an example of how private authority can help reformulate the shape of 
the regime complex in the long term by providing a repository where ideas can “wait” until the 
time to deploy them is ripe.107  The ITTO considered and subsequently rejected the idea of 
labeling in the late 1980s.  However, the labeling approach did not wholly disappear from the 
organization’s agenda.  Rather, the ITTO commissioned the London Environmental Economics 
Council, an environmental think tank, to write a report on the feasibility of incentives for 
improved forest management. The report concluded that trade was actually a relatively 
insignificant concern since very limited quantities of tropical timber were exported. It also 
promoted country-level certification schemes, rather than a global approach of the type being 
discussed and pursued by FSC supporters.108  The important point here is that the FSC consider 
tropical timber trade a critical lever point for improving the management of tropical forests, 
whereas those resistant to this approach felt this was not the best way to understand the problem. 
The persistence of this framing has been important. Arguably, it has helped reinforce more recent 
attention to forest law enforcement and governance. 
 
Finally, for fisheries the reverberation effect appears less pronounced, which may reflect both 
that the MSC formed in part through emulation of the FSC and that the intergovernmental 




In this paper, we have attempted to “unbundle” the regime complex in three ways.  First, we 
maintain that a full understanding of institutional density and complexity is impossible when a 
key source of variation—private authority—is omitted.  Thus, we have inserted private authority 
into our analyses of the three cases of climate, tropical commodities and fisheries.  Second, we 
suggest that no rigorous analysis of regime complexes can occur without a careful definition of 
its boundaries.  We have offered one approach to defining boundaries: identifying the central 
public nodes of the regime complex and their interactions with private authority.  Third, we have 
argued that private authority can potentially provide functional improvements to a regime 
complex through both static and dynamic effects.   
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23                         UNBUNDLING THE REGIME COMPLEX: THE EFFECTS OF PRIVATE AUTHORITY	  
Our analysis leads to four conclusions we feel are important to consider if the concept of regime 
complexity is to underpin a robust research agenda.  First, the theoretical construct of the regime 
has multiple meanings, some of which are at odds with the notion of regime complexity.  
Drezner rightly argues that regime complexity can undermine the institutionalist’s view of 
regimes as providing focal points for cooperation.  By multiplying the number of possible focal 
points, weakening “actors’ sense of legal obligation,” and increasing “transaction costs of 
compliance,” regime complexity potentially conflicts with definitions of regimes that emphasize 
shared norms or convergence of expectations.109 
 
Second, and related to the previous point, regime complexity can promote fragmentation, 
conflict and watering down of rules just as easily as it can promote functional improvements.  
We have argued that under certain circumstances, private authority can fill gaps within the 
regime complex, and potentially provide functional improvements to existing institutions.  It can 
do this by providing alternative formulations of the problem, by providing a space where other 
solutions can “reside” until a policy window opens, or by serving as a mechanism to diffuse 
public rules.  However, these positive outcomes are not necessarily a given.  Although we have 
not explored them in this paper, there are certainly conditions under which private authority 
stymies cooperation rather than enhances it.  The arrival of Max Haavelar in the coffee regime is 
an example of the “gap-filling” function of private authority.  The initiative addressed issues of 
market access and distribution of benefits that ICA did not.  However, in the case of tea, fair 
trade rules served to undermine important gains in social justice achieved through public 
regulation. Similar problems were seen with fisheries: the MSC has been controversial in 
countries where it has been seen to fend off government regulations for fisheries and marine 
conservation. In other words, private authority can be an instrument of powerful actors, and can 
provide additional fora in which those actors can pursue their interests.  We fully acknowledge 
that this is the case; an explanation of the conditions under which these negative outcomes arise 
should be an area of future research.   
 
Third, though beyond the scope of this article to explore, it is also clear that private authority has 
reverberations through to other private institutions. Just as the FLO’s price requirement served to 
highlight another understanding of the commodity problem and solution to it, the price premium 
has also been a comparative benchmark for other private certification programs. Similarly, the 
FSC and IFOAM group certification systems have been referenced as programs to emulate by 
other systems.110 This highlights additional ways whereby effects may reverberate among public 
and private institutions in longer reaction chains, rather than simply a single interaction.   
Reverberation among private authority in the climate regime complex is also evident; many 
voluntary carbon standards recognize each other.   
 
Fourth and finally, our analysis of regime complexity has emphasized the importance of time: in 
order to understand fully the effects of private authority, we must include dynamic effects—the 
ways in which private authority “reverberates,” shaping and conditioning future public 
authority—as well as static ones.  We call attention to the fact that although we are among the 
first to extend the time horizon in considering the effects of private authority, that even this 
extension is incomplete.  In future research, we hope to consider the ways that private authority 
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may experience path dependence of its own.   In sum, serious investigations of the reverberation 
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